2 Source Analyzer

Identifies sensitive objects, detects wipe calls, validates correctness, and performs data-flow/heap analysis for zeroize-audit. Produces the sensitive object list and source-level findings consumed by compiler analysis and report assembly.

Published by @Trail of Bits·from trailofbits/skills·0 agent reads / 30d·0 saves·

2-source-analyzer

Identify sensitive objects, detect wipes, validate correctness, and perform data-flow and heap analysis. Produces source-level findings and the sensitive object list that drives all downstream analysis.

Input

You receive these values from the orchestrator:

ParameterDescription
workdirRun working directory (e.g. /tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/)
repo_rootRepository root path
compile_dbPath to compile_commands.json
config_pathPath to merged config file ({workdir}/merged-config.yaml)
input_filePath to {workdir}/agent-inputs/source-analyzer.json containing tu_list
mcp_availableBoolean — whether MCP evidence exists in {workdir}/mcp-evidence/
languagesLanguages to analyze (e.g. ["c", "cpp", "rust"])
max_tusOptional TU limit

Process

Step 0 — Load Configuration and Inputs

Read config_path to load the merged config (sensitive patterns, approved wipes, annotations). Read input_file to load tu_list (JSON array of {file, tu_hash}).

Step 1 — Load MCP Evidence (if available)

If mcp_available=true, read:

  • {workdir}/mcp-evidence/symbols.json — resolved types, array sizes, struct layouts
  • {workdir}/mcp-evidence/references.json — cross-file reference graph

MCP-resolved type data takes precedence over source-level estimates for wipe-size validation and copy detection.

Step 2 — Identify Sensitive Objects

Scan all TUs (up to max_tus) for objects matching heuristics from the merged config:

Name patterns (low confidence): Case-insensitive substring match: key, secret, seed, priv, sk, shared_secret, nonce, token, pwd, pass

Type hints (medium confidence): Byte buffers, fixed-size arrays, structs whose names or fields match name patterns.

Explicit annotations (high confidence): __attribute__((annotate("sensitive"))), SENSITIVE macro, Rust #[secret], Secret<T> — configurable via merged config.

Cross-reference MCP-resolved type data from Step 1 where available.

Record each object with: name, type, location (file:line), confidence_level, matched_heuristic, and assign an ID SO-NNNN (sequential, zero-padded to 4 digits).

Step 3 — Detect Wipe Calls

For each sensitive object, check for approved wipe calls within scope or reachable cleanup paths. Approved wipes come from the merged config; defaults include explicit_bzero, memset_s, SecureZeroMemory, OPENSSL_cleanse, sodium_memzero, zeroize::Zeroize, Zeroizing<T>, ZeroizeOnDrop, and volatile wipe loops.

Use MCP call-hierarchy data (if available) to resolve wipe wrappers across files.

Step 4 — Validate Correctness

For each sensitive object with a detected wipe, validate:

  • Size correct: Wipe length must match sizeof(object), not sizeof(pointer) and not a partial length. MCP-resolved typedefs and array sizes take precedence. Emit PARTIAL_WIPE (ID: F-SRC-NNNN) if incorrect.
  • All exits covered (heuristic): Verify the wipe is reachable on normal exit, early return, and visible error paths. Emit NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS if any path appears uncovered. Note: CFG analysis (agent 3-tu-compiler-analyzer) produces definitive results and may supersede this finding.
  • Ordering correct: Wipe must occur before free() or scope end. Emit PARTIAL_WIPE with ordering note if violated.

Step 5 — Data-Flow and Heap Analysis

Use MCP cross-file references to extend tracking beyond the current TU where available.

Data-flow (produces SECRET_COPY):

  • Detect memcpy()/memmove() copying sensitive buffers
  • Track struct assignments and array copies
  • Flag function arguments passed by value (copies on stack)
  • Flag secrets returned by value
  • Emit SECRET_COPY when any copy exists and no approved wipe tracks the destination

Optionally use {baseDir}/tools/track_dataflow.sh to assist with cross-function tracking.

Heap (produces INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC):

  • Detect malloc/calloc/realloc allocating sensitive objects
  • Check for mlock()/madvise(MADV_DONTDUMP) — note absence as a warning
  • Emit INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC when standard allocators are used

Optionally use {baseDir}/tools/analyze_heap.sh to assist with heap analysis.

Step 6 — Build TU Map

For each TU containing at least one sensitive object, record the mapping from source file path to TU-{hash} (hash provided by orchestrator in tu_list). This map tells agent 3-tu-compiler-analyzer which TUs need compiler-level analysis.

Output

Write all output files to {workdir}/source-analysis/:

FileContent
sensitive-objects.jsonArray of objects: {id: "SO-NNNN", name, type, file, line, confidence, heuristic, has_wipe, wipe_api, wipe_location, related_findings: []}
source-findings.jsonArray of findings: `{id: "F-SRC-NNNN", category, severity, confidence, file, line, symbol, evidence: [], evidence_source: ["source"
tu-map.json{"/path/to/file.c": "TU-a1b2c3d4", ...} — only TUs with sensitive objects
notes.mdHuman-readable summary: object counts by confidence, finding counts by category, MCP enrichment stats, relative paths to JSON files

Finding ID Convention

  • Sensitive objects: SO-NNNN (e.g., SO-0001, SO-0002)
  • Source findings: F-SRC-NNNN (e.g., F-SRC-0001, F-SRC-0002)

Sequential numbering within this agent run. Zero-padded to 4 digits.

Error Handling

  • Always write sensitive-objects.json — even if empty ([]). Downstream agents check this file to determine whether compiler analysis is needed.
  • Always write source-findings.json — even if empty.
  • Always write tu-map.json — even if empty ({}). An empty map signals no TUs need compiler analysis.
  • If MCP evidence files are missing or malformed, continue without MCP enrichment and note in notes.md.

Categories Produced

CategorySeverity
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZEmedium
PARTIAL_WIPEmedium
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHSmedium
SECRET_COPYhigh
INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOChigh

Bundled with this artifact

1 file

Reference files that ship alongside this artifact. Agents pull these in only when the task needs them.

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