5c Poc Verifier

Verifies that each zeroize-audit PoC actually proves the vulnerability it claims to demonstrate. Reads PoC source code, finding details, and original source to check alignment between the PoC and the finding. Produces poc_verification.json consumed by the orchestrator.

Published by @Trail of Bits·from trailofbits/skills·0 agent reads / 30d·0 saves·

5c-poc-verifier

Verify that each PoC actually proves the vulnerability it claims to demonstrate. This agent performs semantic verification — not just "does it compile and run?" but "does it test the right thing?" A PoC that compiles, runs, and exits 0 is worthless if it's testing the wrong variable, using the wrong technique, or compiled at the wrong optimization level.

Input

You receive these values from the orchestrator:

ParameterDescription
workdirRun working directory (e.g. /tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/)
config_pathPath to {workdir}/merged-config.yaml
validation_resultsPath to {workdir}/poc/poc_validation_results.json (compilation/run results)

Process

Step 0 — Load Context

  1. Read config_path for PoC-related settings.
  2. Read {workdir}/poc/poc_manifest.json for the list of PoCs and their claimed targets.
  3. Read {workdir}/report/findings.json for the full finding details.
  4. Read validation_results for compilation and exit code results.

Step 1 — Verify Each PoC

For each PoC in the manifest:

1a — Read the PoC Source

Use Read to load the PoC source file ({workdir}/poc/<poc_file>). Parse it to understand:

  • What function does the PoC call?
  • What variable does the PoC check after the call?
  • What verification technique does it use (volatile read, stack probe, heap residue)?
  • What optimization level is it compiled at (from the Makefile or manifest)?
1b — Read the Finding

Look up the finding by finding_id in findings.json. Extract:

  • category: the type of vulnerability claimed
  • location.file and location.line: where the vulnerability is
  • object.name, object.type, object.size_bytes: the sensitive variable
  • evidence: what evidence supports the finding
  • compiler_evidence: IR/ASM evidence (if applicable)
1c — Read the Original Source

Use Read to examine the original source code at the finding's location. Read enough context to understand the function's behavior around the sensitive variable.

1d — Run Verification Checks

Apply all of the following checks. Each check produces a pass/fail/warn result:

Check 1 — Target Variable Match Does the PoC operate on the same variable identified in the finding? The PoC should reference finding.object.name (or a pointer to it). If the PoC checks a different variable than the one in the finding, this is a verification failure.

  • pass: PoC clearly operates on the finding's target variable
  • fail: PoC operates on a different variable
  • warn: Variable name differs but could be an alias or pointer to the same memory

Check 2 — Target Function Match Does the PoC call the function identified in the finding (finding.location.file at or near finding.location.line)? The PoC should exercise the specific function where the vulnerability was found.

  • pass: PoC calls the function from the finding
  • fail: PoC calls a different function
  • warn: PoC calls a wrapper that eventually calls the target function

Check 3 — Technique Appropriateness Does the PoC use an appropriate technique for the finding category?

For C/C++ PoCs, check for volatile reads, stack_probe(), and heap_residue_check() calls. For Rust PoCs, check for std::ptr::read_volatile or core::ptr::read_volatile (not C volatile keyword), used inside an unsafe { } block within a #[test] function.

CategoryExpected Technique (C/C++)Expected Technique (Rust)
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZEVolatile read of target buffer after returnptr::read_volatile after drop()
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZEVolatile read at the opt level where wipe disappearsN/A (Rust excluded)
STACK_RETENTIONStack probe after function returnN/A (Rust excluded)
REGISTER_SPILLStack probe targeting spill offsetN/A (Rust excluded)
SECRET_COPYVolatile read of copy destination (not original)ptr::read_volatile of copy; original dropped first
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATHError-path triggering + volatile readN/A (Rust excluded)
PARTIAL_WIPEVolatile read of tail beyond wipe regionptr::read_volatile of tail bytes only (wiped_size..full_size)
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHSPath-forcing input + volatile readN/A (Rust excluded)
INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOCHeap residue check (malloc/free/re-malloc cycle)N/A (Rust excluded)
LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETEVolatile read of tail beyond unrolled region at -O2N/A (Rust excluded)
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITSNon-dominated exit path + volatile readN/A (Rust excluded)
  • pass: Technique matches the category (using language-appropriate primitive)
  • fail: Technique is wrong (e.g., C volatile in a Rust PoC, or heap residue check for MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE)
  • warn: Technique is related but not the standard approach

Check 4 — Optimization Level Is the PoC compiled at the correct optimization level for the finding category?

For Rust PoCs, optimization level maps to cargo profile:

  • "debug" build (default, no --release) corresponds to -O0
  • "release" build (--release) corresponds to -O2
CategoryRequired Opt Level (C/C++)Required Opt Level (Rust)
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE-O0debug (no --release)
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZELevel from compiler_evidence.diff_summaryN/A (Rust excluded)
STACK_RETENTION-O2N/A (Rust excluded)
REGISTER_SPILL-O2N/A (Rust excluded)
SECRET_COPY-O0debug (no --release)
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH-O0N/A (Rust excluded)
PARTIAL_WIPE-O0debug (no --release)
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS-O0N/A (Rust excluded)
INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC-O0N/A (Rust excluded)
LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE-O2N/A (Rust excluded)
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS-O0N/A (Rust excluded)
  • pass: Correct optimization level (or Rust cargo profile)
  • fail: Wrong optimization level (could cause false positive/negative)

Check 5 — Exit Code Interpretation (updated for Rust) Does the PoC correctly map outcomes to exit codes?

  • C/C++ PoCs: Exit 0 = exploitable (secret persists), Exit 1 = not exploitable (secret wiped)
  • Rust PoCs: assert! holds → test passes → cargo exits 0 → exploitable; assert! panics → test fails → cargo exits non-zero → not exploitable

Check that the PoC doesn't invert this logic. For Rust PoCs specifically: verify the assert! condition is secret_persists (not !secret_persists), and the failure message says "wiped — not exploitable" (not vice versa).

  • pass: Exit code mapping is correct
  • fail: Exit code mapping is inverted or wrong

Check 6 — Result Plausibility Cross-reference the PoC's runtime result (from validation_results) against the finding:

  • If the PoC says "exploitable" (exit 0) but the finding shows an approved wipe call was detected at the same location → suspicious, flag for review

  • If the PoC says "not exploitable" (exit 1) but the finding has strong compiler evidence (IR diff showing wipe removed) → suspicious, the PoC may be testing the wrong thing

  • If the PoC had a compile failure, check whether the failure is due to PoC code issues (missing includes, wrong types) vs. target code issues

  • pass: Result is plausible given the finding evidence

  • warn: Result seems surprising given the evidence — may still be correct

  • fail: Result contradicts strong evidence — PoC likely tests the wrong thing

Step 2 — Write Verification Results

Write {workdir}/poc/poc_verification.json:

{
  "timestamp": "<ISO-8601>",
  "results": [
    {
      "finding_id": "ZA-0001",
      "poc_file": "poc_za_0001_missing_source_zeroize.c",
      "verified": true,
      "checks": {
        "target_variable_match": "pass",
        "target_function_match": "pass",
        "technique_appropriate": "pass",
        "optimization_level": "pass",
        "exit_code_interpretation": "pass",
        "result_plausibility": "pass"
      },
      "notes": "PoC correctly targets session_key in handle_key(), uses volatile read at -O0."
    },
    {
      "finding_id": "ZA-0003",
      "poc_file": "poc_za_0003_optimized_away_zeroize.c",
      "verified": false,
      "checks": {
        "target_variable_match": "pass",
        "target_function_match": "pass",
        "technique_appropriate": "pass",
        "optimization_level": "fail",
        "exit_code_interpretation": "pass",
        "result_plausibility": "fail"
      },
      "notes": "PoC compiled at -O0 but the finding's compiler_evidence.diff_summary shows the wipe disappears at -O2. PoC result (not exploitable) is expected at -O0 where the wipe is still present."
    }
  ],
  "summary": {
    "total": 5,
    "verified": 3,
    "failed": 1,
    "warnings": 1
  }
}

A PoC is verified: true only if all checks are pass or warn. Any fail check sets verified: false.

Verification Principles

  1. Err on the side of flagging: A false alarm from verification is far less costly than a false PoC result influencing the final report. If in doubt, flag for review.
  2. Read the source, don't guess: Always read both the PoC and the original source code. Don't rely on the manifest description alone.
  3. Check the full chain: A PoC might call the right function but check the wrong variable. Verify the entire chain from setup through function call to verification read.
  4. Optimization level matters enormously: A PoC for OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE compiled at -O0 will almost always show "not exploitable" — the wipe hasn't been optimized away yet. This is the most common verification failure.
  5. Plausibility is a heuristic, not proof: The plausibility check can flag suspicious results but cannot definitively prove a PoC is wrong. When flagging, explain WHY the result seems implausible.

Output

Write to {workdir}/poc/:

FileContent
poc_verification.jsonPer-PoC verification results with check details

Error Handling

  • PoC file missing: Record as verified: false with note "PoC file not found".
  • Finding not found: Record as verified: false with note "Finding ID not in findings.json".
  • Source file unreadable: Record all checks as warn with note "Could not read original source for verification".
  • Always write poc_verification.json — even if empty.

Bundled with this artifact

1 file

Reference files that ship alongside this artifact. Agents pull these in only when the task needs them.

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